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Clientelism and Politicization: 
The Case of Corsica during the French Third Republic (1870-1940) 
Jean-Louis Briquet (CNRS, University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) 
 
 
Politicization is a central issue in the political history of the French Third Republic. A large 
part of historians on this period have indeed focused on the ways in which the populations 
(the rural populations in particular) were integrated into national politics in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, and on the ways in which they assimilated the “republican 
model.” Two major, closely connected phenomena have been highlighted in this regard: (a) 
the “descent of politics into the masses" (to borrow an expression of Maurice Agulhon), 
namely dissemination in the rural areas of national ideologies and political values, as well as 
voters’ education in active citizenship (interest in public affairs, electoral participation, 
collective claims, etc.); and (b) the disappearance of the traditional ruling classes, called the 
“notables” in French, and more specifically, the waning influence of traditional authorities in 
the countryside (landowners, the nobility, and the clergy) to the benefit of the new political 
elites from the middle classes (small rural bourgeoisie, doctors, lawyers, teachers, etc.), the 
majority of whom were already sold on the republican idea. Renewal of the political elite 
also signified a decline in the old practices of political patronage and clientelism on which 
the power of the former notables had been based, to the benefit of a more abstract political 
exchange based on opinions, beliefs, and mobilization in defense of collective interests. 
 
This summarized statement is of course a drastic simplification of a rich and diversified 
historiography that has given rise to many controversies. Common to this historiography, 
however—and this is this point that I would especially like to underscore—beyond its 
diversity and controversies, is a conception of political modernization formulated, for 
instance, by Eugen Weber in his book Peasants into Frenchmen. The conception equates 
democratic politicization with a process of voters’ involvement in national politics, learning 
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the standards of republican citizenship, and the assimilation of ideologies and political values 
disseminated by the national political movements, as well as with a process of emancipation 
from the political patronage and social, economic, and cultural dependence characteristic of 
traditional rural communities. 
 
In this perspective, the continued power of notables and its related political exchanges 
(clientilist trade-offs, in particular) can only appear as the manifestation of, as stated by 
Eugen Weber, a primitive stage of political life. According to this view, where the earlier 
political power arrangements persisted (in the peripheral areas of the national territory: 
rural areas in the south of the France, the Alps region, or Corsica, for instance), they can only 
be regarded as an “archaic situation,” in which the population involved was relegated to the 
margins of the national-integration and democratic-politicization process happening in the 
rest of France. 
 
The research I have conducted on the political elite in Corsica under the Third Republic has 
led me to challenge this proposition, or at least to qualify it considerably. Indeed, my 
research has shown that the power of the notables and the existing clientelism actually 
served as channels to ingrain electoral democracy and the republican state in Corsica, that 
these were in fact the central mechanisms for politicizing the populations and achieving 
their adjustment to modern politics. In this paper, I will present the main points of my 
argument. (a) First, I will show that establishment of the Third Republic in Corsica did not in 
the least curtail the power of the former notables, but also that it brought with it the 
formation of new republican elites who, for purposes of competing with the former notables 
in the electoral market, actually adopted behavior patterns very similar to theirs, including 
clientelistic practices. Thus, “modern” forms of politics (open electoral competition, 
pluralism of parties and opinions, public management of the territory in collaboration with 
local elected representatives, etc.) were established without producing any deep changes in 
the forms of political ties between voters and their elected representatives (clientelism) and 
with no radical transformation in the characteristic forms of exercising power in Corsica (the 
power of notables). (b) As the second point of my argument, I will uphold the idea that the 
clientelistic ties established with the notables, old or new, did not in any way prevent the 
populations from adopting “modern” politics. On the contrary, it seems that in the case of 
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Corsica, it was indeed through clientelism and relationships with the notables that the 
populations became interested in voting, became involved in local political networks, 
endorsed lasting partisan identities, and assimilated “modern”-type political categories and 
values (ideologies, collective beliefs, etc.). In short, it seems that it was precisely through 
clientelism that these populations were politicized. 
 
 
[1] 
 
As I have explained, the dominant political figure in Corsica during the Third Republic was 
the notable. Many of Corsica’s parliamentary representatives throughout this period came 
from old influential families. This was the case, for instance, of the Gavini family, originally 
prominent landowners in the north of Corsica, whose first representatives held public offices 
(“Podestà,” magistrate, or member of a local assembly) at the end of the ancien régime and 
during the administration of the constitutional monarchies of the first half of the nineteenth 
century. As shown in the simplified family tree of the Gavini family, elective offices were 
passed down within the family almost continuously. Denis, born in 1820, served in the 
administration of the Second Empire (he was state councilor then prefect between 1852 and 
1870), then became a parliamentary representative of Corsica at the beginning of the Third 
Republic. His nephew Antoine, a lawyer in Bastia, succeeded him in this position, which he 
held for 35 years, from 1889 to 1924, before “passing it on” to one of his sister’s sons, 
François Pietri, also a senior civil servant (general auditor, then ambassador). All of these 
“Gavinist Party” leaders, as well as other members of the family (notably their brothers) held 
local political offices. 
 
Where did these notables draw their political authority? (a) First, in their social prestige, 
connected with their wealth, with their influence on the local administration and on state 
institutions, and with their family’s reputation (the political capital of the family is evident in 
the family’s genealogical tree: family members managed it collectively and it could be 
passed on inside the family group). This is how many historians have defined the notion of 
notable: for example André-Jean Tudesq (author of a famous book on the major notables of 
France in the mid-nineteenth century) stressed the “close relationship” (the conjunction) 
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between economic, political, and social power (while Paul Veyne, in the very different 
context of ancient Greece and Rome spoke of “aggregation of superiorities” in reference to 
the dignitaries of these societies). (b) The power of the notables, however, did not only come 
from the population’s passive recognition of their somehow “natural” supremacy. It also 
followed from the active involvement of these notables in activities that generated and 
maintained the loyalty and allegiance of their voters.  
 
Clientelistic trade-offs were crucial to these processes. By offering services and favors to 
voters, notables confirmed their authority doubly: first they made their supporters 
dependent on them for access to critical resources (jobs, charity, and various types of 
assistance); then they strengthened their prestige and legitimacy by acting in accordance 
with the moral duties related to their role. In other words, borrowing from Pierre Bourdieu, 
they increased their “symbolic capital” by founding their domination on moral obligations, 
which in turn provided them with the recognition and gratitude of their “clients.” 
 
As long as farming activities remained predominant in Corsica (that is, until the end of the 
nineteenth century), the clientelistic resources distributed by notables were primarily 
related to land ownership. Economic management of the properties was closely associated 
with the management of the family’s political capital, as explained for example by the leader 
of a local party to a journalist investigating politics in Corsica in the mid-1880s. Part of the 
family lands were leased to tenants under “fairly mild conditions,” and “rigorous” payment 
of rent was not always required; free grazing of herds on the properties was “tolerated,” as 
well as wood gathering or hunting (but, as stated by the same notable, only their “friends” 
were allowed this tolerance). Notables also granted individual assistance (monetary loans or 
charity, for instance) or collective assistance (small pubic facilities such as fountains, 
communal wash houses, or road construction, for instance). They interceded with the public 
authorities on behalf of their “clients” in case of trial, land or commercial dispute, etc. In 
return, they received from their clients, in the terms of the above-mentioned testimony, 
“complete devotion.” “I give my life and, so to speak, my fortune to our clients, and our 
clients give us their vote. “This is our secret,” said the notable in question. “In the past,” he 
added, “they would have followed us to war; today they follow us to the elections” (Paul 
Bourde, En Corse, Paris, Calman-Lévy, 1887, p. 81). 
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Notwithstanding, clientelistic resources were rapidly diversified. With the development of 
state presence on Corsican territory, the value of land-related resources would gradually 
depreciate. First, because public resources would grow and become central in clientelistic 
trade-offs in the form of administrative jobs, state welfare, or public subsidies—where many 
of these resources were distributed directly or indirectly by local elected representatives. 
Then, because emigration became the main means to achieve social mobility for the 
inhabitants of a region affected by a farming crisis and very poorly industrialized. Clientelism 
was thus increasingly a way to leave Corsica, in particular through the allocation of positions 
in the colonial administration (20% of which, around 1920, were held by Corsicans, whose 
total number of 280,000 amounted to only 1% of the total French population), in public or 
state enterprises on the mainland (particularly in Marseilles, where in 1911 nearly 7,000 
families were from Corsica, or around 25,000 persons). 
 
Thus, the distribution of “administrative resources” became decisive in accessing political 
positions, and in maintaining them. Some of the former notables adapted to the new 
situation; and this was the case of the Gavini family. Under the direction of brothers Antoine 
and Sébastien, they organized in Corsica a “political machine” including municipal officials, 
election officials, small village community leaders, etc., which allowed them to expand their 
electorate base and to preserve their influence in local institutions. They became part of the 
national political-power spheres (parties, parliamentary groups, senior civil service, or 
government elites), as attested to by the career of François Pietri, who was a senior official 
of the colonial administration in Morocco in the 1920s, then in the 1930s, minister several 
times. New elites who were foreign to the world of the big notables, however, were also 
able to access the distribution channels of “administrative resources.” This was the case of 
the new republican politicians, who were from the small and middle bourgeoisie, often 
university-educated (they were products of the republican “meritocracy”), who were 
competing with former notables by also using clientelism. The political career of Emmanuel 
Arène, a parliamentary from Corsica from 1881 to his death in 1908, is a good example. Son 
of a merchant of Ajaccio (the regional capital), he studied law in Paris at the end of the 
Second Empire, was actively involved in the republican circles (he was close to Léon 
Gambetta), and was private secretary to the Minister of the Interior in 1879. He was sent to 
6 
 
Corsica to establish the "Republican Party" there, a task he accomplished successfully thanks 
to support from the local administrative authorities and to his role as mediator with the 
central power, which allowed him to distribute many “favors” to the voters and local elected 
officials attached to him (public employment, road construction, railway construction, 
grants, etc.). His successor as leader of the Republican Party, Adolphe Landry, was the son of 
a senior magistrate (district attorney in Corsica, then in Paris); he simultaneously led an 
academic career (he was a rather famous professor of economic demography in the Collège 
de France in Paris) and a political one (mayor and councilor in Corsica, member of parliament 
between 1910 and 1940, Vice President of Parliament, and minister several times between 
the two world wars). Here again, his access to the “administrative resources” offered to him 
by his closeness to the state, a leading position in a national party, a parliamentary and 
ministerial career, or more generally speaking by his being part of the circles of power 
(government and freemasonry), was crucial to building local leadership and to respond to 
voters’ demands, to the requests of local elected representatives, and in this way, maintain 
the ties of loyalty and interest that materialized the existence of the Republican Party at the 
grassroots level. 
 
I cannot go into the details of the changes in politics in Corsica under the Third Republic. I 
would just like to emphasize two main points: (a) First, that establishment of the Republic 
did not do away with the former clientelistic practices. On the contrary, the new political 
class, which had played an active role in this establishment, but also the heirs of the old 
families of notables who managed to preserve their political positions, used their influence 
in the distribution channels of public resources to win voters and set up political alliance 
networks on the territory. (b) Then (and this is certainly the most important point), that 
these clientelist practices were adapted to political modernization, i.e. to the establishment 
of the institutions characteristic of “modern” politics: local public bureaucracies (the 
resources of which politicians sought to control and manage); political parties (formed 
largely on the basis of alliance networks powered by clientelist trade-offs); and open 
electoral competitions (among parties and groups competing for access to clientelist 
resources).  [Possibilité élargissement au cas de l’Italie du Sud : Gribaudi] 
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[2] 
 
The second point of my argument will be shorter. I would like to show here that clientelism 
relations were part of the populations’ politicization and their adjustment to modern 
politics, in their practical forms (voting or participating in public life), as well as in their 
symbolic forms (acquiring political knowledge, having and expressing opinions, and 
identifying with a political party). Three main points can be developed in this regard. 
 
(a) Clientelism was first a powerful way to get rural populations interested in politics. It 
allowed politics to take root in the daily lives of the populations and provided them with a 
very concrete connection between politics and the social stakes and issues that mattered to 
them. Establishing a lasting political link with a notable and expressing one’s loyalty and 
support by voting gave access to essential material resources: use of land and communal 
property for farmers and herders; opportunities for social mobility through administrative 
employment or emigration, or improvement of living conditions through the attribution of 
social allowances or public subsidies. Not only did this make voting tangibly significant for 
voters (leading them to become interested in electoral politics and to participate in them), 
but modern political institutions (governments and political parties) also penetrated local 
society through activities directly related to the daily lives of the populations. It would 
otherwise not be possible to understand the “passion” for politics that most observers 
(journalists, officials stationed on the island, and writers) attributed to Corsicans: the 
frequent acts of violence during election periods (going as far as assassinations), the festive 
events involving many voters (processions celebrating a victory, humiliation rituals for the 
losers, etc.), testified to the importance acquired by politics in the ordinary social life of the 
populations (at the same time, in fact, as to the politicization of traditional forms of local 
folklore). 
 
(b) There is a second point that I would like to emphasize about relations between 
clientelism and politicization. Clientelist trade-offs did not preclude reference to abstract 
political values, beliefs, or ideological repertoires or partisan agendas. In their public 
statements, politicians frequently combined such references with statements of their ability 
to meet their voters’ clientelist demands. Here is an example of fairly limited scope, but 
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quite significant from my point of view: that of a candidate’s speech in the local elections of 
1928 (he was the son-in-law of Adolphe Landry, who would be elected Deputy of Corsica in 
1932), which was summed up by a prefecture official in these words: “After having given his 
thanks, Mr. Campinchi [the candidate's name] stated the meaning of his candidacy, arguing 
that he had answered the call of his many political friends, and that he proposed to put at 
the service of his future constituents the benefit of all his relations by ensuring his complete 
devotion to them.” He then glorified the republic and its government, and said, speaking of 
Napoleon, that he was the most republican of the emperors of his time. His commitment to 
use his “relations” to provide “services” was closely linked to his expression of political 
affiliation (to the “Republic”) and, at least implicitly, to the values it embodied. This is a very 
minor example and may seem something of a caricature silly; but it shows that the candidate 
needed to assert an ideological and partisan brand and signify his espousal of general 
political values. Beyond this example, we may assume that the provision of clientelistic 
goods and services can be associated with the normative learning of political values and 
ideals and that it could be an instrument of political “pedagogy,” according to logics close to 
those of the “democratic clientelism” studied by Maurice Agulhon in Provence in the mid-
nineteenth century. [Phénomène qui a été décrit aussi dans des contexts très différents ; par 
exemple celui des banlieues communistes autour de Paris, par Padioleau] 
 
(c) This brings me to my third and last point regarding the way in which clientelism 
participated in the politicization of the populations. Clientelist trade-offs were not limited to 
bargaining (votes against favors and services). In rural communities in particular, they 
established solidarity links between a local political “boss” and the members of his 
electorate and, within the electorate, a shared sense of belonging to the same group, the 
same village “party.” This “party” brought together, in most cases, individuals already 
gathered by family or neighborhood ties or by being part of the same social or cooperation 
networks (brotherhoods, companionship famers’ associations, professional networks, 
Masonic lodges, and so on). A broad range of social relations were thus expressed through a 
common political identity, which became an essential “identity marker” for individuals and 
contributed to making of their political (partisan) affiliation an essential dimension of their 
social identity. 
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Here, rapidly presented, are the three main elements that have allowed me to conclude that 
clientelism, far from being an obstacle to democratic politicization, could have been be one 
of its instruments. On the one hand, it contributed to interesting people in political activities 
by linking these activities to the concrete issues of their daily lives; on the other hand, it was 
part of the political education of these populations by familiarizing them with ideological 
categories and national political labels, and by leading them to reformulate, under the terms 
of a shared political identity, a set of social relationships in which they were already 
involved. 
 
 
[3] 
 
This conclusion contradicts the usual way in which most historians and social scientists 
consider clientelism. They have presented it either as a political archaism and an obstacle to 
democratic politicization, or, when it has been found in modern political institutions, as a 
dysfunction in these institutions, a misuse of their legitimate objectives. Instead of this 
marked opposition, in this paper I have tried to stress hybridization, the possible links 
between legitimate forms of modern politics (civicness, democratic citizenship) and the 
material trade-offs that can be brought about through use of democratic politics 
(clientelism). This conception leads to reviewing the notion of politicization by conceiving it 
as the process through which some populations take concrete ownership of democratic 
politics, depending on the stakes and interests of their material existence—rather than to 
just an acculturation to the categories and legitimate values of democratic politics. 
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